CPSIA – John Stuart Mill and Crib Safety

“I have observed that not the man who hopes when others despair, but the man who despairs when others hope, is admired by a large class of persons as a sage.”

John Stuart Mill
1828

The CPSC recently congratulated itself for banning drop-side cribs. Scott Wolfson clucked on Twitter: “RT @Scott_wolfson: The lifesaving crib rules approved by #CPSC today are a key part of the #CPSIA. #CPSC wants all babies to have a #safesleep.” Other people, like Rep. Jan Schakowsky, also rushed forward to take credit for this change in regulation.

To judge from these press releases, a real crisis in public safety has been addressed. Is that true?

Wasn’t it Winston Churchill who once said that history is written by the victors???

I have not touched the crib issue previously because, frankly, it’s too hot to handle. Who would want to defend a product associated with baby deaths? There but for the grace of G-d goes I. On the other hand, the projected compliance expense of $550 million is breathtaking, particularly given the fact that the agency’s ruling is both retroactive and mandates replacement of cribs in certain childcare facilities. Even Commissioner Robert Adler calls this expansion of the CPSC’s role as “uncharted territory“. This sets a new precedent for government (CPSC) intrusion that I find troubling, even under these circumstances.

The always astute Lenore Skenazy questions the CPSC’s justification of three fatalities a year linked to drop-side cribs. She labels herself “subversive” for looking at the numbers. [You know you were thinking it, admit it!] Based on the injury figures released by the CPSC, she notes that the deaths attributed to drop-side cribs are less than those attributed to spider bites (five per year). She puts the drop-side crib-related deaths in the context of 4 million births per year and asks where the limit is in our effort to save ourselves.

Skenazy rattles off many other death statistics (such as 1,300 per year from stair falls) for further perspective on the scale of the drop-side crib “crisis”. She does not discuss pool deaths, which number between 1-2 per day and generate 11-12 childhood emergency room treatments for serious injuries daily. But the obsession of this CPSC is drop-side cribs, so we should not worry about those other things . . . .

Lenore makes a good point. What IS the limit? And how much should we pay? Is this really a public health crisis, and if it is, aren’t all those other causes of childhood deaths similarly a crisis? Who gets to decide which crisis is our top priority?

As J.S. Mill points out, despair sells well so we are naturally inclined to accept on face value the shrill self-congratulations of the politicians who are so busy making us so safe. I have been battling the same self-justifications and self-praise by politicians and consumer “advocates” over lead for three years. Does the absence of injury statistics matter to anyone?

Interestingly, the CPSC provides some context on its crib decision. If you read through the document announcing the change, you will find out a few interesting tidbits:

• Despite Ms. Schakowsky’s claim to have created this regulatory storm, the industry has been working on standards for many years. ASTM F 1169–10, the full-size crib standard, was originally published in 1999 and has been revised several times since 1999, including 2010. The same can be said of the voluntary standards for non-full-size cribs. The statement in the CPSC press release noting that “[t]he federal crib standards had not been updated in nearly 30 years” is pretty misleading – the voluntary standards relied upon by the agency and the industry have been regularly revised. [Until this administration took over, the CPSC relied on voluntary standards as a matter of public policy.] Even more remarkably, please note that the current CPSC action adopts these voluntary standards as the new mandatory standards with minimal amendments, calling the adopted standards “substantially the same” as the voluntary standards. Hmmm.
• The CPSC initially issued mandatory standards for cribs in 1973 and amended them in 1982. There has been on-and-off activity at the agency in the ensuing years. Crib safety was not a new subject to the Commission when Ms. Schakowsky announced the latest crisis. Ms. Schakowsky didn’t solve the crisis either when she purportedly wrote this provision of the CPSIA. Is it actually certain that there ever was a crisis in drop-side cribs . . . or was Ms. Schakowsky simply looking to bulk up her hagiography?
• Annual sales of cribs are estimated at 2.4 million per year, including non-full-size cribs (approximately 300K per year). Thus, over 11 years (2000-2010), that’s 32 deaths and an estimated 26.4 million cribs sold and 40 million babies born. Crisis? There are approximately 591 models of full-size cribs and 81 non-full-size cribs on the U.S. market, according to the CPSC. In recent years, the CPSC has recalled 11 million “dangerous” cribs defect” since 2007 (about 40% of the estimated total sales in the last 11 years).
• A pilot CPSC project of data gathering on crib injuries from November 1, 2007 to April 11, 2010 generated a total of 3,584 “incidents”, including 147 deaths associated with full-size cribs. Some of these incidents go back as far as 1986, btw. Of the 147 fatalities, 107 were not related to any structural defect in any way. Of the 35 fatalities related to “structural problems”, 18 were related to drop-side cribs. [The CPSC document contains a detailed analysis of the injuries, as well.] So of entire pool of fatalities from cribs in this period, 18 of 147 were related to drop-side cribs in some way – 12% of the total fatalities. The CPSC press release somehow omitted this additional fact.

This data cannot be correlated to the December 17 CPSC press release in which they note 32 deaths since 2000 (11 years). There is no data provided on the AGE, CONDITION or QUALITY of the cribs involved in the deaths, no information on the MAINTENANCE or STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY of those cribs or whether the hardware failure was apparent or not. In its May 7th press release, the CPSC notes however that the 32 deaths include “some [fatalities which] occurred in cribs where the drop side detached without caregivers noticing the detachment, while some other deaths occurred after a consumer tried to repair the detached drop side, but the repair ultimately failed.” [Check out the photos to see what a consumer "repair" might look like.] No quantification whatsoever. Arguably, this CPSC statement suggests that any solution to the problem involves, in whole or in part, user education.

The CPSC did not supply data to distinguish between product failures/defects and parental or caregiver error or misuse. It’s all laid at the feet of the crib design. The CPSC’s “analysis” is pretty simple – you don’t need drop-sides for your baby to sleep comfortably in a crib, and if we eliminate drop-sides from the market, presumably a certain number of unnecessary infant deaths can be avoided. It’s a presumption, however.

It’s hard to argue with their logic but it’s also hard to know what has been accomplished. We do know that the ban of drop-side cribs costs a lot of money, however. Isn’t that relevant, even a little bit? If user education is essential to ANY “solution”, how do we know we have spent our $550 million well or achieved anything whatsoever? The precise mechanism leading to the fatalities cannot be determined from the paltry data released to the public. Table pounding by advocates is, regrettably, not data. As Mr. J.S. Mill notes, the advocates’ histrionics are likely to be taken as “sage” in this case. What if we knew that ten years out, the replacement cribs caused the same number of deaths or perhaps even MORE deaths? The rate of fatalities in these cribs in already remarkably low. How can we be sure that the new cribs will be better? Should we just take Nancy Cowles’ word for it?

I find it interesting that the crib industry has been rather quiet on this change in rules. There are literally dozens of suppliers of cribs in this country, and more than 11 million units have been recalled. Why such quiet from these companies? I suspect the reason is that most consumer do not blame the brands for these recalls, and few people are motivated to return their cribs. [That includes me. Consumer advocates label recalls "unsuccessful" when we the people don't do what they want us to do.] So the cost of the recalls is probably modest BUT the government is mandating that $550 million be spent by childcare providers on NEW cribs. Why would crib manufacturers object to this cost-effective stimulus plan?! Surely many people taking the old drop-side crib out of the attic will say “Whoa, that was recalled. I better buy a new one . . . .” Many, many people.

Thank you, CPSC, for making us so darned safe! The crib industry probably loves you (secretly). Not so sure about hotels and childcare providers. Ultimately I know who pays for all this, however, and it isn’t the consumer advocates or the regulators. It’s the guy who stares back at you from your bathroom mirror.

The CPSC for its part did something easy and self-serving: they saved us from yet another lurking danger that none of us could see, all at our expense. I wonder if the CPSC would be as enthusiastic in their actions if they had to pay for it out of their own budget (or pocket). The money they spend is OURS, and they never even need to steady their hand to write the check. I don’t know about you, but I think it’s much easier to spend someone else’s money, especially when there are a lot of zeroes involved. The CPSC is making us do it for our own good. Does anyone see a problem here?

The new rule sets dangerous new standards for CPSC (government) intrusion into our businesses and into our lives. The CPSC’s action means that the Commission thinks it’s now okay to take retroactive action with impunity. This is a BIG change in regulatory policy. Bob Adler notes: “The Commission has never before entered into a rulemaking, whether or not required by Congress, that not only has retroactive applicability, but also requires the replacement of every product in a given product class – particularly in an occupational setting like child care facilities.” OMG – and this is okay . . . why??? Because he says it’s a crisis and it’s important to do.

This is government power without restraint, and it’s a serious issue. This is much more serious that drop-side crib deaths. I do not know how to run a business in a market regulated by people who make up the rules to suit their mood. I thought there were protections against this.

Let’s hope Mr. Adler and his associates made a good judgment for all of us. They are spending our money and we have no choice but to do as we’re told. That’s “government of the people, by the people, for the people” nowadays, I guess.

I wonder what Abe Lincoln would think of this government . . . .

Read more here:
CPSIA – John Stuart Mill and Crib Safety

CPSIA – Component Testing Rule Comment Letter

August 3, 2010

Todd A. Stevenson
Director, Office of the Secretary
Room 820
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Agency: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)

Re: Docket No. CPSC–2010-0037 Conditions and Requirements for Testing Component Parts of Consumer Products.

Dear Mr. Stevenson:

I am hereby submitting comments in response to the Solicitation of Comments on the Conditions and Requirements for Testing Component Parts of Consumer Products (Docket No. CPSC–2010–0037) published in the Federal Register on May 20, 2010 (the “Proposed Rule”).

This request for comments comes after, among other things, a two-day workshop held at the CPSC on December 10-11, 2009. Our company incurred the expense of sending three people (all panelists on multiple panels) to attend this “sold out” event which was purportedly to solicit stakeholder feedback on this rule and the so-called “15 Month Rule” (also up for comment today). There is little evidence from the Federal Register that any of our feedback was taken or possibly even heard. I have lost track of how many comment letters I have filed, panels or hearings I have appeared at and essays or letters I have written about the CPSIA and these issues. So far, my comments have added up to . . . nothing. Nevertheless, I am filing this letter in the vain hope that perhaps this will be my lucky day and you may listen to me, finally.

I would like to make some general comments first.

a. Some Positives in the Proposed Rule. I am in favor of the concept of component testing and applaud the Commission for taking steps to make it a reality, however flawed. In addition, I am also enthusiastic about composite testing. Regrettably, however, the devil is in the details.

b. CPSC Data Demonstrates that Risk is Low, so the Proposed Rule does not Need to be so Strict. I have analyzed the recall data published on the CPSC website and determined that from 1999 – 2010, the CPSC can account for ONE DEATH and THREE ASSERTED INJURIES from lead or lead-in-paint. If the goal of these rulemakings is to reduce deaths and injuries from lead, then these data must be borne in mind. With so few incidents involving lead injury of any kind in children’s products (less than occurs on AN AVERAGE DAY from swimming pools and spas in the U.S.), there is no justification for building such an ornate rule for something simple and logical like component testing or composite testing. Likewise, incidents of fraud in testing are equally infrequent and in any event, already addressed by other statutes. Congress did not require this complicated regulatory scheme, and the data cannot justify it.

c. The Proposed Rule Puts Compliance First, Before Safety. This rule seems to place a very high emphasis on the need to comply, as opposed to the need to make children safer. One is not necessarily the equivalent of the other. My favorite example is our company’s record of compliance. Founded in 1984, our company has recalled a grand total of 130 pieces in its history, all recovered, out of perhaps one billion pieces sold. Not bad. Were we to meet the myriad requirements of this rule, I cannot fathom that our products would be safer. Does all that extra compliance benefit anyone? It certainly will cost a lot (we pay, you don’t). As I read your rule, I wondered why you didn’t list the wire transfer instructions for the top testing companies. You might as well . . . . Still, the casual waste of our resources cannot make anyone safer – they were already completely safe.

Safety is the reason the CPSC exists. This document fails because it confuses the desire to powerfully enforce the CPSIA with actually making people safer. The only thing that may be accomplished is business death for many companies, principally small ones. Swashbuckling enforcement may make great headlines but no one will be any safer. Compliance is not safety.

d. Science Has Apparently Been Rendered Moot at the CPSC. While I accept that Congress has banned certain phthalates in toys, I do not accept that the ban is a SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSION. It is legislation, not science. Notably, the CPSC has twice investigated phthalates and held that phthalates were safe in toys. Yet, on page 28213 in the Federal Register, the Proposed Rule discusses the “risk” presented by a product that might have a violative concentration of phthalates in a component, but with an overall concentration that wouldn’t violate the ban. It goes on to assert that a component-based rule is “more protective of human health”, as though the agency had reached the scientific conclusion that phthalates were dangerous – which is not true. Re-characterizing the legislative ban as an assessment of “risk” may appear to legitimize your rule, but it is certainly not an accurate statement of the historical position of the agency. I object to the rule’s equating of a ban by politicians to a scientific judgment. Science is under enough assault without the stamp of approval of the CPSC announcing its death.

My specific comments on this proposal:

1. Component Testing Looks Better Than It Is. I wish I felt we (or anyone else) would use component testing extensively in the future. There are several reasons why this option will be of little use to anyone, particularly the small companies that it was intended to benefit. [Companies with enough scale may find the Proposed Rule useful – one of the many ironies of the CPSIA is that its principal beneficiaries may be the companies that prompted its passage.]

a. Limited Market Availability for Component Certificates. While some high volume components of children’s products may quickly be tested to meet these requirements, many other kinds of components are not likely to be tested:

i. Low volume components
ii. Components made in small lots
iii. Components made by small suppliers (many fabrics)
iv. Components which derive only a tiny percentage of revenues from regulated products or which principally cater to other industries (e.g., paper clips or aluminum foil in a science kit)

Unfortunately, it appears to me that the logic of this rule is that if we can be certain that some certificates will be widely available (e.g., paint, plastic pellets), therefore all other certificates will be available. That’s plainly ridiculous.

b. Complexity. The subdividing of compliance testing into component parts and the whole, some tests done on parts and some on the whole, with tests of varying dates substituting from time to time, is simply a mindboggling mess. I cannot imagine that this can be successfully managed on any scale (how many products need to take advantage of this rule before test reports develop big and inconsistent holes?). And how will retailers be able to interpret this patchwork quilt of tests? This scheme will be self-defeating on all levels.

Add to this the requirement that components need to be traceable, and you basically rendered the component testing opportunity moot. Of course, I am presuming that industry will take your rules seriously. To me, it’s completely inconceivable that anyone will build your traceability system. [Traceability will not raise revenues, only mindless complexity, and as noted above, cannot conceivably improve safety.] If you take these rules seriously, you will cry, laugh/scream – or walk away. The paperwork required for this exercise is well beyond almost all companies’ capabilities. [Does the CPSC have ANY tangible evidence that its requirements can be met by anyone . . . other than Mattel and Wal-Mart? Presumably, no one at the agency living in the real world thinks that traceability rules can be met by the typical Handmade Toy Alliance member, or other small businesses like ours.]

c. Unrealistic Expectations on Manufacturing Control and Traceability. To take advantage of this rule, a manufacturer must take responsibility at the sub-micro-level for manufacturing quality. Let’s recall for a moment that we are not making drug treatments here, nor are we building the Space Shuttle. We are making simple plastic toys and games, children’s shoes, pens, shirts, books, educational materials and so on. Consider this instruction from your new rule: “The manufacturer must exercise due care that the manufacturing process does not add a prohibited chemical from an untested source, such as the material hopper, regrind equipment, or other equipment used in the assembly of the finished product.” Our company has several hundred vendors producing thousands of SKUs – do you honestly believe we could possibly manage how all these independent companies wash out their molding machines or manage their regrinding operations? Is this some kind of sick joke?

By the way, this verbiage will end the use of recycled materials in children’s products. This is completely unjustified for safety reasons and is certainly very unfriendly to the environment. As noted above, your agency’s responsibility is to manage safety. You have no basis in fact for asserting that these theoretical sources of lead are or could constitute a public safety risk.

d. Liability Risk. The Proposed Rule goes to great length to ram home the message that all the risk is on our shoulders. The monotonously repetitive use of the term “due care” throughout this document makes abundantly clear that the CPSC is perfecting a myriad of claims to be made against any and all manufacturers of children’s products when it suits the purpose of the agency. Many of the claims may be perfected with the agency’s 20-20 hindsight. The Proposed Rule minces few words on this preservation of rights: “The above information is needed so that, if noncomplying products are found, the Commission can use this information to determine whether a finished product certifier, component part certifier, or third party conformity assessment body is not complying with the appropriate requirements.” Under the Proposed Rule, even a missing piece of paper can be the basis of charge of failed due care. A fear of criminal charges seems realistic.

Will aggravating letter writers be the first to suffer under this hammer? The answer is – it’s entirely up to YOU under your rule. Small companies will see how the deck is stacked against them and steer far from the component testing option (if they understand the obtuse wording of the rule).

2. If Few Companies Can or Will Use Component Testing, Has the Agency Provided “Relief”? Of course, the answer is NO. The Proposed Rule may look like good policy, but if the practical impact of the rule is that few people can or will take advantage of it, it is simple window-dressing. The impact on small businesses, exemplified by the well-known and sympathetic Handmade Toy Alliance, will be severe. They are not the only ones in need of help, either. If small companies like HTA members cannot take advantage of these rules in large part or would be too scared to take a chance in the face of the awesome display of governmental power in the rule’s terms, then they will suffer and shrink. I would note that the Notice on the “15 Month Rule” explains how a failure to protect small companies could play out badly (see “Caveats and Possible Market Reactions to Third Party Testing Requirements” on page 28358). Those negative impacts could result from a failure of policy here, too.

3. Maintenance of Records for the Life of a Product Plus Five Years Is Unduly Burdensome (Not to Mention Pointless). Please consider our case: We still produce certain items from our original product line in 1984. Clocks don’t go out of style in education, even if Tickle Me Elmo and Furby last only one year. The requirement that we must retain records for the life of the product plus five years could theoretically be forever in our case. Perhaps the CPSC can provide us free unlimited warehouse space for all these records. In any event, our case also makes clear how pointless this requirement is. We have only had one recall in 26 years, which we successfully administered without the assistance or guidance of the thousands of pages of rules and legislations that befell us under the CPSIA. How, precisely, will decades of records improve the public weal in OUR case? Your rule is very good at spending our money, our resources and our time, but doesn’t make a reasoned connection to safety in any way. We are not Mattel and in any event, they don’t define the market. Had you listened to us in December 2009 at your workshop, you would know this already.

4. Composite Testing Rule for Paint LOWERS the Lead Standard to Sub-trace Levels. In yet another example of overly risk-averse rulemaking, the agency’s new composite testing rule for paints requires that lead content must never exceed that for any individual component paint in the composite. This slices the 90 ppm limit by two-thirds for a three-paint sample and by 75% for a four-paint sample. This super-stringent rule ensures that it is literally a gamble to use composite testing – so why would anyone bother? Even more bothersome, since the new policy of the agency is to impose strict liability for lead-in-paint violations, this new rule demonstrates the ascendency of the debunked notion that there is “no safe level for lead”. If the agency really wants to take this position, it should not permit composite testing for paints. Too risky . . . .

5. The Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is Flawed and Self-Justifying. The analysis justifying this Proposed Rule is a “best case” scenario, and takes none of the foregoing into account. If in fact the rule will hard or impossible to use, or will create too many legal risks or recordkeeping burdens and thus go largely unused, the reasoning in this section will be completely inapplicable.

6. The Burden of Recordkeeping is FAR GREATER than Asserted in the Proposed Rule. At our company, we produce about 1500 “catalog” items and several thousand other SKUs and custom products through a network of hundreds of factories in various countries. We do not control these factories – they are generally family businesses like our company, and are independent of us. Typically, we provide only a small share of annual revenue of any of our factories and thus have limited leverage over their business practices. Like many small businesses, we have a very limited infrastructure in place to supervise factories “on the ground”, although it is worth noting that our safety record indicates that our business methods have worked well for more than two decades.

To implement the recordkeeping set forth in this rule, I estimate that we would have to spend $50,000 – $100,000 in software development expenses to store and manage the desired records. In addition, we would need to expand our staff significantly. To reach out to all of our factories, negotiate and monitor many new business practices, will take a significant increase in staff. I posit that we would need to open an Asian office with as many as 5-10 local employees. A Chinese office would cost us at least $500,000 per annum. In addition, we would have to increase our clerical and management staff in the U.S. to help with data input, software management, project management, audits, vendor relations and general management. This would cost us at least $250,000 per annum. We anticipate that this intrusion on the business practices of our vendors would cost us business relationships and would lead to significant cost increases. The total cost of these disruptions would add another $500,000 or more per annum. It is not inconceivable that we ALONE could incur annual expenses of $1.5 million and certainly at least 10 man-years of labor (more than 20,000 hours) to comply with these rules. There are THOUSANDS of companies affected by this rule. We estimate that the assessment of cost and man-hours in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of the Proposed Rule is LOW by a factor of 100x-5,000x.

I would suggest that this rule be greatly simplified by making the following changes:

a. Eliminating the Requirement for Traceability Recordkeeping. As noted above, this ornate rule architecture is completely inappropriate for the minimal, almost non-existent threat, demonstrated by the CPSC’s own injury data. Recordkeeping requirements should minimized or dropped altogether.

b. Encourage the Exercise of Business Judgment. The presumption that only the CPSC (or Congress) can make sound judgments when considering safety issues is simply not supported by the data. Again, our company is a good example of that – we scrupulously maintained our safety record without the CPSC’s oversight, coercion or even encouragement since 1984. The concept of “business judgment” is well-defined in U.S. common law and has real meaning under the law. I think the concept of using components supported by GCCs is simple enough. Given that the restrictions on lead are clear under the CPSIA, why not let businesses exercise their judgment on how to meet those requirements and then measure them on their success in doing so? What is to be gained by inserting the CPSC into all aspects of how we conduct business? We were doing just fine before you arrived on the scene.

Given the few lead injuries noted in the CPSC’s historical data, the agency could save its scarce resources and remain effective as a safety administrator by focusing on known safety issues and incidents and leave the vast majority of law-abiding and safety-conscious companies ALONE. The data suggests that higher and higher mountains of regulations will never reduce injuries from the historically miniscule levels documented on the CPSC website.

c. Allow Composite Testing Using the Overall Concentration as the Pass/Fail Measure. Again, this is justifiable based on the historically minimal risk posed by the regulated substances. The already low lead levels specified in the CPSIA have not reduced injuries or deaths from the negligible levels that predated it. Since the number of recalls is so dramatically affected by agency policy (e.g., strict liability or not, how recalls are accounted for, etc.), the only reliable measure of the effectiveness of policy is injuries. Composite testing holds the promise of real savings to the many law-abiding companies affected by the CPSIA. Loosen the noose and they may actually save some money.

Component testing can be a simple and effective way to lower costs, but a different approach is necessary to get to that result. A sharp reconsideration of the Proposed Rule will be required to achieve this goal.

Thank you for considering my views on this important subject.

Sincerely,

Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
380 North Fairway Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061

Read more here:
CPSIA – Component Testing Rule Comment Letter

CPSIA – In Defense of Lead

Perhaps you have been expecting it. After all the “heat” in this blog over the past year, finally, my defense of lead. Hope you’re happy now. . . .

Last Friday, Commissioner Bob Adler posted his long-awaited position paper on lead and related CPSIA issues. Weighing in at 21 pages and 89 footnotes, Mr. Adler’s paper includes a thorough recitation of facts as well as his recommendations about the law. Among other things, he recommends making the lead exemption process more flexible and allowing clothing to be sold through charity resale shops. He also left the door open to changes that would ease the economic burden of the CPSIA on small businesses and low-income consumers. I agree with all of these changes – but I also think many other and more extensive changes are needed, too. I do not agree with the basis of Mr. Adler’s reasoning, however, and that makes all the difference.

Mr. Adler devotes about half of his statement to a detailed analysis of lead safety, reciting many facts not in dispute. Unfortunately, he then leaps to familiar conclusions that we have seen in recent Commission meetings and which are also found in many of his written statements. He does signal some extremely limited flexibility on lead, more or less hewing to the line put forth by Central Casting.

Ironically, Mr. Adler’s statement sometimes leaves you wondering where he stands, since he seems so sympathetic to both sides. It is frustrating to not have a clear picture of how he really sees the world. I fail to find persuasive his argument that the lead rules are good for us when they lead to ridiculous results like the banning of brash bushings on toy cars. Mr. Adler himself noted in the Learning Curve hearing that the brass bushings pose NO risk to children at a hypothetical tipping point with blood lead levels (in other words, the toys were incontrovertibly safe) – and then voted to ban them because the law compelled it. This should trigger a sense of outrage in the Commissioner . . . but it doesn’t.

To me, as an ex-lawyer, the illogical results documented in the Learning Curve case are intolerable. It is proof of a defective law and a defective system. Banning acknowledged safe products is a SIGN of problems, not something to rejoice in. As you know, it costs money to toss away perfectly good product. It also costs a lot of money to employ CPSC staff and Commissioners to decide silly cases like the brass bushing case. Something’s quite wrong if we are celebrating a system so obviously broken.

i believe there are fundamental flaws in Mr. Adler’s views on lead which prompt him to make recommendations basically defending a broken, illogical and self-destructive legislative system. Let me start by stating what I considered to be incontrovertible facts:

• Lead is bad
• Lead can be dangerous to children
• Harming children is bad, and unacceptable if reasonably foreseeable.
• Lead poisoning in children is largely if not entirely the fault of lead house paint and leaded gasoline

Mr. Adler makes the latter point in his footnote 83: “Clothing is not a significant source of lead poisoning. Far and away the greatest source of lead poisoning is lead paint in older housing, lead-saturated soil from gasoline emanated over the years from automobile exhausts, and lead-saturated dust (both from paint and gasoline).” [Other citations omitted] It is important to remember that Mr. Adler KNOWS that blood lead level problems stem from house paint and the long term consequences of years of leaded gasoline use (particularly in the inner city).

Mr. Adler tries to prove that lead is bad – but that fact beyond dispute. He goes further and builds the case that there is no “safe” level of lead, providing citations. Thus established, he then seems to justify the legislation’s strict terms based on the logic that if science hasn’t identified a safe level for lead, every instance of lead is therefore dangerous: “We may have currently reached the outer limits of our ability to measure negative effects of exposure to small amounts of lead, but that does not mean that no adverse effects are occurring. It basically means that we do not know.” Scary stuff. . . but what does he really think?

It’s hard to tell. Notwithstanding his assertion that no level of lead is safe, Adler seems oddly reassured by the permitted levels set by Congress: “[Given] that lead remains ubiquitous and often unavoidable, policymakers who are fully aware of lead’s risks, have sought to determine some level of lead that would be acceptable – at least until new information becomes available.” And these all-knowing policymakers (Congress) set a retroactive scheme of rapidly declining permitted lead levels. In other words, what was considered “safe” (meaning legal) on February 9, 2009, was “unsafe” on February 10, 2009, and what was considered “safe” on February 10, 2009 became “unsafe” on August 14, 2009, and what was “safe” on August 14, 2009 promises to become “unsafe” on August 14, 2011. Mr. Adler analyzes retroactivity under the CPSIA in his statement and then endorses it. Huh?

I fail to grasp the logic of either Congress or Mr. Adler here. Is lead in substrate dangerous or is it not? Is there a safe level for lead or is there not? Is lead safe on one day, and not safe on the next day? If so, can someone explain the science of that safe/unsafe trigger to me? I believe Mr. Adler’s accommodative attitude toward the lead standards and retroactivity is best explained by politics than by any notions of safety or risk.

It is even harder to take Adler’s stern tones on lead seriously when you consider the volume of lead elsewhere in a child’s life. Will regulation of lead in substrate in children’s products have any material impact on blood lead levels? Can anyone prove that it will, or that the cost of getting rid of all the lead is worth the cost? Remember that we could redeploy the same money for more impactful projects, like eliminating high lead levels in drinking water in schools or remediating soil contaminated with lead. We have already covered the fact that Mr. Adler knows that blood lead levels are fundamentally tied to exposure to leaded house paint and contaminated soil. It is also well-known that cars are coated in lead paint, legally under our laws. Lead is also in our food chain, is found in nature – and enters our bodies every day. [For data on this topic, see "Eat My Dust".] By obsessing on children’s products in the face of these facts, Congress ensured that its new legislation would fail to deliver measurable results.

In essence, the slogan “no safe level for lead” connotes a risk-free condition. “Risk-free” is an unrealistic standard and FAR too expensive as public policy. Mr. Adler uses this formulation in his lengthy analysis of used clothing sales: “In sum, I cannot state with certainty that a “safety” threshold of, say, 1 µg/dL blood level change would never occur from zipper sucking. . . . The fact that I cannot say there is no risk is why I characterize the choice [between allowing and banning resale of used clothing] as between bad and worse.” [Emphasis added] Mr. Adler is not following a legal principle here, he is asserting one. This is the precautionary principle, the famous Nanny State being implemented before your very eyes.

It is difficult to diffuse an argument based on the elimination of all possible risk. If we wish to organize our society around the elimination of risk, rather than the management of risk, we are doomed. All of us, not just the children’s product industry. The sad truth is that no one in the Federal government can prove that the policies of the last 35 years on lead caused injury. Mr. Adler implicitly asserts that our inability to prove that it DIDN’T is enough justification to throw the old system out. This is a belief system, not science.

The fear of risk is fanned by the threat of undetectable dangers. Mr. Adler notes: “To say the effects [of lead on healthy children] are not directly observable is not to say that that they are minor.” He amplifies this point by implying a link to children’s products to lead injuries without any proof of a relationship: “[MRI] technology has permitted us to identify permanent damage in adults stemming from childhood lead exposures.” Exposure to what, precisely? ABC blocks or the soil next to an inner-city apartment building in the leaded gasoline era? Mr. Adler’s assertion that we just don’t know what the harm is dodges the real question – how do you know there is any harm resulting from THESE USES OF LEAD? No answer is supplied because no one can answer that question.

The Adler statement paints a pretty compelling picture and the 89 footnotes were presumably intended to add academic gravitas to his arguments. However, not all academics agree with Adler. Here are videos of the presentations of two Ph.D.s who specialize in risk assessment in children’s products and lead issues taking an opposite view: Richard Reiss of Exponent and Barbara Beck of Gradient. They both note that the dose makes the poison and that only through true risk assessment will a sensible safety system be possible.

A couple brief notes:

- Mr. Adler talks a lot about retroactivity in the CPSIA. At the end of the day, he comes down . . . get ready for it . . . in favor of retaining retroactivity, but also for the recommendation of the Commission to make the pending 100 ppm lead standard prospective. I am not commenting on his arguments other than to say that I think relaxation of this provision would bring considerable economic relief without any possibility of physical harm to anyone. That’s enough reasoning for me.

- In calling for change to the lead exemption process, Adler is apparently willing to support only “a modest expansion in the amount of discretion granted to the Commission”. I find this rather curious and unexplained – he only wants a little discretion. Why? Does he worry that the Commission can’t handle the responsibility for full discretion? Again, why? I wonder if greater powers suggested this very limited recommendation out of a lack of “trust”, namely trust of future Commissions not hand-picked by this Dem-dominated Congress. No matter the explanation, it is curious indeed to see a Commissioner ask Congress to extend his Commission limited discretion.

- Adler devotes considerable space to sale of children’s clothing at resale shops. He ultimately recommends that charity resale shops be allowed to sell children’s clothing (possibly subject to posted Proposition 65-like warnings, see footnote 88). Adler’s logic in this section is puzzling to me. Is Adler trying to defend children or defend the CPSIA? He concedes that clothing has no history of causing injury from lead but is apparently troubled that it cannot be proven that a child couldn’t be harmed by clothing. Incredibly, he resolves the dilemma by distinguishing between resales made by charity shops and by for-profit shops, leaving the latter out of his proposed exemption. So is he approving the sale of unsafe products by charity resale shops to poor people so they can stay warm? Or is he saying that the clothes are probably safe, but can’t be sold by for-profit stores for . . . what reason? If the clothing is safe to sell, sell it . . . and if it isn’t, don’t. WHO sells it shouldn’t matter. But apparently it does.

An aside: Mr. Adler uses some strong language to discuss those of us who have pushed back on this law: “As I have waded into the debate, I have encountered many thoughtful, sincere, and anguished concerns about the CPSIA. I have also heard numerous overheated arguments, scanned many bloviating blogs, and read great numbers of error-laden emails (and letters) commenting on the law.” For those of you who don’t know this SAT word, “bloviating” is defined as “[to] discourse at length in a pompous or boastful manner” on dictionary.com. I wish our government officials would stick to the issues and avoid attacking the exercise of Free Speech by U.S. citizens. This is particularly the case here, since after a long fight, many of those bloviaters have been proven right. I don’t expect thanks, but I think this is out of line.

I could go on, but I won’t. Mr. Adler’s voice in the debate is an important one and I appreciate his efforts to set the record straight. I don’t agree with him and appreciate the opportunity to reply.

You be the judge!

Read more here:
CPSIA – In Defense of Lead